ABSTRACT: This paper studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. In 1714, the British government tightened the usury laws, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6 to 5 percent. A sample of individual loan transactions from a goldsmith bank allows us to examine how interest rate restrictions affected loan allocation. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly. Access to credit for those of noble origin improved, while it worsened for those with less "social capital". Collateralized credits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role of prominence. While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this likely. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets substantially. We find no evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.
I. Introduction
Almost since the beginning of recorded history, usury restrictions have been widely used. The laws of Hammurabi from the 2 nd millennium B.C. regulated interest rates, as did the Old Testament and the Catholic Church. While early rules often outlawed the taking of interest altogether, later restrictions stipulated maximum permissible interest rates. To the present day, many developing and Islamic countries and US states impose limits on private loan contracts to stamp out predatory lending by "credit sharks"; Italy only recently re-introduced a law against usurious credit contracts [Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) ; Blitz and Long (1965) ; Homer and Sylla (1996) ].
The effects of usury regulation have remained controversial. Numerous scholars have argued that they had damaging consequences, and that this conclusion applies to both the prohibition of interest as well as to limitations on maximum rates. Max Weber famously argued that the Catholic Church's restrictions on interest slowed capital accumulation and growth. 1 Ekelund et al. (1989) examine medieval restrictions on maximum interest rates. Their explanation centers on the role of the church as a borrower and regulator of credit intermediation. Lower interest rates, in their view, served to extract rents from lenders. Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) , on the other hand, argue that usury laws act as a form of insurance that transfers resources from states of the world where the marginal utility of income is low (when households are well-off) to states when it is high (after negative income shocks, etc.). They show that usury restrictions can be Pareto-improving if income shocks are mainly temporary and idiosyncratic.
This study exploits a unique dataset on hundreds of loan transactions, derived from the archives of a private London bank, Hoare's, in the early eighteenth century.
These records contain detailed evidence on loan rates, amounts lent, and the identity of borrowers. When the English government changed the usury rate in 1714, Hoare's Bank drastically altered its loan allocation policy. We find that minimum loan size increased sharply after the reduction in the usury limit, in line with the predictions of a view of lending behavior as profit maximization with fixed costs rather than as providing social insurance. Discrimination in favor of wealthy and well-connected borrowers increased, suggesting that the bank sharply reduced the risk profile of its lending activity. This implies that the usury laws in England provided little if any insurance, and instead acted as a means of rent-extraction. We use quantile regressions
and matching estimators to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. Finally, we document a retreat into collateralized borrowing after the change in the usury law, in line with predictions. In combination, these findings suggest that even relatively small changes in government regulation of credit transactions can have drastic effects on loan allocations.
There is a large literature on the effects of usury laws. Detailed studies of medieval attitudes towards usury are provided by Le Goff (1988) and Munro (2003) . Baumol (1990) emphasizes the usury restrictions' effect on the allocation of talent, concluding that the effects since antiquity have been damaging. Galassi (1992) argues that the development of the Genoa's capital market in the late Middle Ages was severely constrained by usury laws. Some evidence showing that low interest rates are connected with slow growth is discussed by Fry (1995) . Few studies have examined the effects of the usury laws empirically based on micro-data. One exception is Alessie et al. (2001) . They study the introduction of legal maxima on interest rates for consumer credit in Italy in 1996. These rates were set at 1.5 times average rates on similar transactions. The authors find that credit allocation did not change markedly -rejection rates stayed broadly constant after the change in the law. One of their counterfactual simulations suggests that, absent the general decline in market rates, rejection probabilities could have increased slightly. 2 Yet the main reason for not finding a significant effect is probably that, before the change in Italian law, only very few loans were made at rates that were about to become illegal.
Empirical studies have been rare partly because economic historians traditionally believed that usury laws were rarely obeyed. Yet there is growing evidence that, at least in some countries and periods, usury laws were strictly enforced, and that evasion was difficult and rare [Rockoff (2001) ; Tan (2001) ]. There are also substantial practical difficulties in tracing the effects of usury laws, since conclusive studies require micro-evidence, which is hard to find for most of the historical periods when usury restrictions were in force. 3 Also, while regulations remain unchanged, it is conceptually difficult to determine how lending decisions would have been made in the absence of constraints.
2 Alessie, Hochguertel and Weber 2001. 3 Existing historical studies do not analyse the economic impact in any detail (Shatzmiller 1990 ).
Other related literature includes work on financial repression and the interaction of finance and growth. Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) argued that the quality of financial services was as important as quantity. Demetriades and Luintel (1996), (1997) analyzed financial conditions and aggregate time-series evidence for India, arguing that financial regulations retarded economic growth on the subcontinent. Fry (1997) summarized the experiences with restrictions in several countries, and argued in favor of financial liberalization. Finance during the Industrial Revolution has long been regarded as unimportant. Few enterprises before 1850 received any external, intermediated funding. While a lively literature has highlighted the importance of finance for growth [Levine (1997) ; King and Levine (1993) ; Levine and Zervos (1998) ; Rousseau and Sylla (2003) ], the consensus view is that finance did not matter for the British Industrial Revolution. 4 Our results could provide an indirect and partial explanation for why lending to enterprises was rare: regulatory intervention may have stood in the way of efficient capital allocation. This would also imply that the benign effects of the Glorious Revolution, emphasized by North and Weingast (1989) , may well have been smaller than is commonly thought.
We proceed as follows. The next section places the change in the English usury law in 1714 in its historical context and describes how our dataset was constructed.
Section III derives testable implications from a basic model of lending behavior, and Section IV presents our main empirical results as well as possible objections. Finally, the conclusion offers some speculations on the possible economic effects of interest rate regulation in eighteenth-century England.
II. Data and Background
In this section, we give a brief overview of the legal context of the natural experiment that we exploit. We explain the origin of our data and the way it was collected, and provide a summary of some key characteristics.
Usury laws in England
Before 1545, lending at interest was outlawed, although the restriction did not apply to Jews and other marginalized groups. Henry III set a maximum rate of two pence per pound per week, equivalent to 54 percent per year, for transactions involving a Jew.
4 Mokyr 1999 , Neal 1994 From 1545 to 1552, a maximum rate of 10 percent applied to all transactions. Under Queen Mary, the taking of interest was once more outlawed in 1552. It was reinstituted in 1571 at a maximum permissible rate of 10 percent. This was lowered in three consecutive steps, to 8 percent under James I, to 6 percent in 1660, and to 5 percent in 1714. Throughout the period, punishment for transgressions was severe; the standard penalty for usurious contracts was forfeiture of three times the principal and interest [Rockoff (2003) ]. The change in the law applied from the end of September of the year. 5 No records of the Parliamentary debate on the usury law have survived, but a contemporary pamphlet by an anonymous author lobbied for a reduction in the usury rate from 6 to 4 percent because other countries had lower rates and "It will be to the cent, the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it. Where the legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is fixed but a very little above the lowest market rate, sober people are universally preferred, as borrowers, to prodigals and projectors." 9 Eventually, the liberal argument in favor of reducing state intervention in private loan transactions won. In 1833, usury limits were lifted for bills of exchange; they were finally abolished for all transactions in 1854. We plot the median interest rate on loans made by Hoare's over this period in Figure 1 . The graph suggests that Hoare's bank strictly adhered to the usury limits. We checked if there were offsetting deposits for customers that might have yielded higher effective interest rates; there is no evidence that borrowers were required to deposit a proportion of loaned funds or that they paid an up-front fee. 14 The median interest rate on new loan transactions against interest dropped from almost exactly 6 percent before 1714 to 5 percent after the change in the limit. The overall degree of compliance is impressive -if the bank did evade the usury laws, it left no traces of such wrong-doing in its account ledgers. As Sydney Homer argued for usury restrictions more generally, the enforcement of interest rate limits in eighteenth-century England was probably effective and wide-spread. 15 Figure 1 also shows that the loan market did not balance through interest rate changes; 92 percent of loans were made at the usury limit. Instead, credit rationing must have been the primary allocation mechanism. This unfortunately also means that we cannot learn much from analysing loans made below the usury limit. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the loan dataset. Median loan value was just over £200, but differences between small and large transactions could be considerable -the Gini coefficient on loan size is 0.72. The maximum loan was for a massive £27,290. Average loan duration was quite short (a median of 281 days). This means that the change in the permitted interest rate affected the bank's loan book quickly. Loan duration could be as short as one day and as long as 38 years. Almost half of all loans were against collateral, of which 4 percent were against mortgages and 13 Cooper 1740. 14 The bank's annual profit calculation also strongly suggests that Hoare's complied with the usury laws. 15 Homer and Sylla 1996. another 7 percent against securities. Members of the aristocracy accounted for 13 percent of all transactions, and those of minor nobility for another 15 percent.
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III. Hypotheses
We focus on changes in lending behavior after 1714. A common view is that changes in interpretation is correct, then we should find large shifts in credit allocation after 1714 -and in a direction that reduced the efficiency of the intermediation process overall. We use the data from Hoare's Bank to distinguish between these views.
The three competing interpretations of usury limits have testable implications. In order to do so, we need to have a closer look at the bank's loan allocation policy. The market for loans, as discussed above, did not balance through changes in interest rates.
Instead, as Figure 1 illustrates, credit was habitually rationed at the maximum permitted interest rate. If the usury laws acted as social insurance -in line with the Glaeser and Scheinkman model -we should expect to find a continuous supply of credit to less advantaged households. Changes in the total supply of credit should be minimaldepositors implicitly know that they will be able to borrow cheaply when they face a negative shock. Also, since banks did not pay interest on deposits, the supply of loanable funds should be unaffected. In equilibrium, those that found it relatively harder to borrow (and to show ability to repay interest and principal) before 1714 should receive greater access to credit. Second, the minimum loan size should drop, as wider groups of creditors can now claim "insurance."
If, on the other hand, the financial repression and rent-seeking models of usury regulations are correct, we should expect the opposite -minimum loan size should increase, and privileged groups should borrow even more on the new, favorable terms.
Lower lending rates translate directly into lower revenue per loan made, and commensurately lower profits. In order to break even and recoup its fixed costs, the bank would need to make loans of greater minimum size. This is the first empirical prediction necessary to support the financial repression interpretation -as the usury laws are tightened, minimum loan sizes increase. A related argument can be made with respect to the bank's credit allocation and the risk of default. Clearly, the extent to which a bank can take on risk depends on the interest rate it is permitted to charge. With a lower rate, the maximum default rate it can tolerate will decline. This yields the second empirical implication -borrowers regarded as relatively more attractive before the change in the usury laws should continue to receive liberal access to credit, while those with less desirable characteristics are (partly or fully) shut out of the market.
Finally, we should expect that the importance of collateral increases as the maximum loan rate is reduced. This allows the bank to reduce its risk in yet another way, effectively closing off access to credit by borrowers who do not own assets equivalent to the value of the loans they seek.
Jointly, the three empirical implications of the financial repression model suggest an implicit test of loan misallocation that is similar in spirit to the method employed by Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) . They examine if families with similar characteristics live in the same type of housing, comparing cities with and without rent controls. We compare loan allocation across time, and argue that any abrupt change in allocation is the result of regulatory intervention.
IV. Empirical results
In this section, we examine the evidence from Hoare's loan ledgers, contrasting the period before 1714 with the years after the change in the usury limit. Before we can analyze the impact of the change in the usury laws, we need to describe what determined lending volumes at the bank. customers also did not receive more credit. As is often the case in studies attempting to explain loan allocation, the overall explanatory power is not high. We use the results in Table 2 to determine how desirable a customer was for the bank, based on observable characteristics such as traceability, gender, repeat customer status etc.
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Since loan sizes were highly unequal, and results could have easily been influenced by outliers, we also estimate median regressions (Table 2) . 19 The results are broadly similar. There are also considerable gains for those "known" to modern-day historians. 17 The positive coefficient for the aristocracy in the median regression suggests that outliers are responsible for the large standard error under OLS. 18 The first principal component of the set of dummies will be used in subsequent analysis as summary variables of how attractive customers were for the bank. In addition, we will focus on the "known" dummy variable, which is a key determinant of customer desirability. 19 Koenker and Hallock 2001.
Changes in average loan size and borrower characteristics
Loan allocations changed markedly after 1714. Average loan size increased after the change in the usury laws -from £640 before the lowering of the maximum permissible interest rate, to £1,259 thereafter. There is no obvious reason why loan demand should have changed to strongly and abruptly; changes in supply are a much more likely explanation, even if we cannot disentangle effects perfectly. Figure 2 compares the two distributions. The lower tail of lending volumes appears to be missing after 1714 -the median value for loan amounts after the change in the law is only marginally above the 25 th percentile before it. In addition to the missing small loans, the distribution overall has shifted to the right, highlighting the fact that the bank was reacting not just as a result of fixed costs, but also changing the risk profile of its lending in a way that led to larger loans. The increase in average loan size is not simply the result of changes in observable customer characteristics. Table 2 shows OLS and median regressions of loan amounts on a set of individual characteristics for the period after the change in the usury law. In all specifications, the intercept increases between the period before 1714 and the years thereafter. This suggests that the bank simply refused smaller loan requests, and only dealt with customers that were sufficiently wealthy (or well-connected enough) to be able to service markedly larger loans. There was also no general trend towards smaller loans before 1713, as eq. (4) in Table 2 demonstrates.
So far, we have examined how the conditional mean and median of the distribution of loan sizes changed with the tightening of the usury laws. The underlying assumption for both OLS and quantile regressions is that the estimated relationship between loan size and borrower characteristics is linear. Matching estimators as commonly used in labor economics can be used to relax the linearity assumptions of OLS. Arguably, there is little reason to expect the effect of being female on lending volume to be constant in our sample. For aristocratic women, the effect may be small, since their family's wealth is generally well-known. For women without a title, the consequences could be much greater. The effects may also not be linear. Matching estimators from groups of "comparable" individuals give greater weight in calculating coefficients to comparisons of people that are relatively similar. Borrowers receive a propensity score based on a set of observable characteristics.
We use nearest-neighbor matching, comparing borrowers before 1714 with someone who had highly similar characteristics after that date. The difference in loan amount received is then used as an estimate of the average treatment effect of the usury laws. As the number of matches, we use either 1 or 4. 20 In addition, we also use the kernel estimator that offers an efficient combination of the nearest-neighbor and groupestimation [Heckman et al. (1998) ]. We match loans on the characteristics of borrowers, using the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 2 as well as the attractiveness indicator and the dummy for repeat customer status. 21 The propensity scores are derived from probit estimation.
We find that the size of the treatment effect is large with all estimators as shown in Table 3 . The unconditional difference of loan amounts before and after 1714 was £623. Using the matched estimates, we find differences between £490 and £630. The effect is significant in all cases. The sharp increase in loan sizes offers support for our first empirical hypothesis. OLS, quantile regressions and matching estimators all show that the bank reacted to the restriction on the interest it could charge by increasing the size of loans it made, and by cutting lending to the smallest borrowers.
The second striking observation concerns the change in the returns to being well-connected in English society, as documented in Table 2 . Before the tightening of the usury laws, being sufficiently high-born or influential to be traceable for modernday historians yielded a median (mean) return of £100 (£852) in additional credit; after 1714, the gain was £650 (£1635), at least double what a borrower without an entry in the DNB or Cokayne's received. The difference is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. The smaller the loan amount, the larger the (relative) benefit of being well-connected. 21 We use the psmatch2 routine by Sianesi and Leuven for kernel matching, using the bootstrap routine with 100 repetitions to estimate the standard error. For nearest-neighbor matching, we use the match estimator by Ibid.. median (mean) loan value was £500 (£1,356), and the average duration was 252 (736) days. The median (mean) interest rate was 1 percent (0.8 percent) lower, suggesting a saving of £4.3 (£21.9) for each typical loan.
The underlying assumption for all the statistical methods used so far is conditional independence -that the error term in a regression of loan amount on borrower characteristics is not correlated with the characteristics themselves. Yet we know that the composition of borrowers changed. The implicit assumption -that the assignment of borrower to the period before or after the change in the usury law was random -may well not hold. If the bank began to discriminate more strongly against certain types of borrowers (not just by reducing their loan allocation, but by excluding them altogether), the true effect may well be larger than our results so far suggest.
To test the robustness of our results, we compare loans to the same individuals before and after the change in the usury limit. If the change in loan sizes can principally be explained by selecting different clients, we should expect these transactions to be unaffected. In addition, we should find that customers that the bank continued to serve after 1714 received larger loan amounts than other customers before the change, but approximately equal amounts thereafter. This is because they constituted what the bank saw as a more desirable group before the change in the usury limit -and while other customers were cut off from credit, Hoare's continued to serve these clients.
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Our data are compatible with such an explanation. We analyze all the customers that the bank served in the period 1705-1714, and then identify those with whom the bank continued a lending relationship after the tightening of the law. Customers who continued to receive loans ranked markedly higher on the attractiveness scale (0.27 vs. -0.029). They were twice as likely to belong to the aristocracy and to qualify as "known"
in our dataset. The number of women who remain as customers is markedly lower than in the pre-1714 sample as a whole, and the number of gentry is higher ( The change in the usury limit had important consequences. It did not make credit more available to disadvantaged groups. Before the change in the usury limit, customers who continued to be served by the bank after 1714 had significantly larger than average loans -more than twice as large. After the change, the difference is very small, negative, and insignificant (Table 6 ). This suggests that the bank actively changed its customer profile, and made an effort to attract a particular type of customer after 1714, borrowers that resembled its preferred customers before then. The bank managed to grow its loan portfolio despite the usury laws. Adapting to a new environment required drastic changes in lending practices, but it did not thwart the business plans of Hoare's bank.
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Use of collateral
If the bank decided to reduce risk, it could have done so by selecting different customers, as described above, and by raising collateral requirements. Table 7 shows the trend in the use of collateral before the change in the usury law and changes thereafter. In every five-year period before 1714, fewer transactions (for lower values)
involved the posting of security by the borrower. This means that the bank did not just contribute liquidity, but genuinely facilitated access to new funds for borrowers -those who received credit did not necessarily already own assets of similar value. During the last quinquennial before the lowering of usury limits, only 1 out of 10 pounds lent was secured by collateral. After 1714, the figure jumped to 67 percent --as high as it had been in the 1690s when the bank had just opened. Thus, the need to minimize risk led to a retreat from genuine credit intermediation; the bank partly returned to its origins as a goldsmith and pawnshop. 25 After the change in the usury law, those with complex loan transactions and repeat customers are markedly less likely having to offer collateral. 23 Results available from the authors upon request. 24 We also examined if aggregate lending volume (or growth) had a systematic effect on the distribution of lending, and found no evidence for this hypothesis. 25 The South Sea bubble is not responsible for the increase in lending against securities. The bank acted very cautiously in lending against shares in 1720, imposing a hefty "haircut" compared to market value, and not lending at all against South Sea shares during the height of the bubble. The proportion of collateralized loans drops to 40.4 percent if we exclude 1720 from our sample -still much higher than during the preceding decade.
Aristocrats, on the other hand, have to post collateral much more often, and those "known" in our dataset are no more likely to be asked to offer securities than others.
Simple probit estimation, with the use of collateral as a dependent variable, confirms this (Table 8) . We find that the probability of having to post collateral increases by 19 percent after the change in the usury law, or by 56-59 percent relative to trend.
This conclusion is reinforced by the kind of collateral used. The one kind of transactions that remained unaffected by the tightening of usury restrictions was mortgage lending. Loans secured by mortgages continued to be much larger than ordinary credits, and increased by 42 percent in value after 1714. In the eyes of contemporaries, the economic implications were not benign. As Adam Smith put it "[t]he only people to whom stock is commonly lent, without their being expected to make any very profitable use of it, are country gentlemen, who borrow upon mortgage."
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Alternative interpretations
What other factors could account for the observed changes in lending behavior? We discuss five possible alternatives -reduced government borrowing needs, shifts in general macroeconomic conditions, the South Sea bubble, and the changing fortune of the Hoare's family.
The Wars of the Spanish Succession ended in 1713. The borrowing needs of the English state were great, and there is growing evidence that "crowding out" was substantial. 27 Could it be that lower demand by the state for funds caused a fall in the market interest rate -which then led to the usury rate following the market rate downwards? This is implausible for a number of reasons. First, the end of war may have led to higher private (as opposed to government) borrowing, but there is no reason to believe that it affected the size distribution of loan demand. Second, the growth of public debt was also almost identical before and after the war -the period 1702-13 saw an increase in debt by £1.7 million, and the years 1714-24 registered a rise of £1.5 million. 28 Therefore, even if "crowding out" of private investment was an important determinant of loan supply, as some authors have argued, the differences in minimum loan size and social composition between the two periods are unlikely to have been caused by reduced state borrowing.
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Also, the periods 1702-1713 and 1714-1725 are broadly comparable in macroeconomic terms. We can rule out the possibility that differences in business cycle conditions are responsible for the changes we find. Despite the impact of the War of the Spanish Succession, Ashton's classification of business cycles suggests no systematic pattern. He found that the first period from 1702-1713 contained two peaks, while the second registered three. Periods of crisis also occurred twice during the first period and three times in the second.
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The change in the usury laws was not driven by a general decline in market interest rates. 31 While Sussman and Yafeh (2002) find that their measure of interest rates fell from 6.1 percent in 1708 to 4.2 percent in 1713, this was not different from earlier fluctuations -the rate also fell from 6.1 percent in 1702 to 4.5 percent in 1705.
Yet the usury rate was adjusted downwards only on the second occasion, not on the first. This suggests that the government decided to 'lock in' the lower rates permanently on the second occasion, perhaps to guard against a rise similar to the one that happened between 1705 and 1708.
We also examined if the year of the South Sea bubble is partly responsible for the results. Since credit conditions were highly unusual -with a credit crunch developing in the fall -this is a real possibility. Also, there may have been a surge of borrowing against collateral [Neal (1990) , Carswell (1993) ]. However, re-estimating Ashton 1959, p. 172-3. 31 This is the argument in North and Weingast 1989. 
V. Conclusions
Controversy about the effects of the usury laws may have continued partly because their consequences depend on the exact economic and institutional circumstances at the time.
What was harmful in 1714 may have been beneficial in 1776 or 1552. Accurate assessments require detailed evidence, preferably at the micro level. These have been hard to obtain for most historical episodes. Our analysis fills some of the gap by using detailed micro data on lending transactions at an eighteenth-century London bank.
The key reason for the change in behavior was that banks could not engage in any but the safest transactions after the maximum lending rate had been cut. Making profits while lending at 6 percent interest was no easy matter; it became harder still with a maximum rate of 5 percent. Hoare's bank had to leverage the partner's capital substantially -and also to pay very little for the funds with which it financed loans.
Depositors received no interest, and leverage ratios fluctuated between 6 and 12. As the high mortality of banks shows, this balancing act was beyond the ability of many aspiring bankers. 32 Defaults also had to be kept to a minimum, and administrative costs managed tightly. The ceiling on permitted interest rates should have kept the bank from lending to all but the most attractive borrowers, who presented minimal risks and could take on large loans. We find that lowering the usury limit reinforced these tendencies, leading to higher average loan values, a larger role of secured lending, and a greater bias towards those of high birth or with important connections in the political elite. The change in the usury law therefore had redistributive effects. This echoes the recent findings by Braggion (2005) , who found evidence that access to credit in Victorian England was much easier for firms that had titled directors. 32 Pressnell 1960.
The Glaeser and Scheinkman explanation for the persistence of usury laws receives no support from our data. As far as we can infer from the data provided by a single bank, in eighteenth-century England, lower limits on permissible interest rates did not facilitate the provision of social insurance. Evidence from the single bank analyzed in this paper also suggests that the change in the usury laws in 1714 had a negative impact on the development of Britain's financial system. The duration of loans fell abruptly after 1714. Borrowers could therefore only use the proceeds of loans for relatively short-term projects. Hoare's retreated into collateralized lending to minimize risks, thus reducing the extent to which it provided intermediated financing -and not just liquidity services. The change in the maximum interest rate was not simply a reflection of falling market rates, as North and Weingast (1989) proposed.
Adam Smith ranked usury restrictions by their relationship with the market rate that would have prevailed in the absence of intervention. The worst outcome was a rate that was set too low, so that most transactions were clandestine and actual rates paid much too high. The second-worst scenario was a limit that was set too high, so that those intent on default could borrow and honest creditors were shut out of the loan market. The optimum was a small spread between the shadow market rate and the legal maximum. Smith believed that, in late-eighteenth century England, the usury limit of five percent was close the optimum. Our evidence suggests that the same was not true for the years following the reduction in the usury limit after 1714. 
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